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"Uncle Sam at the Great Wall" by: Han Han Vuong
(Research/Penn State, Vol. 17, no. 1 (March, 1996))
Before 1979, foreign interest in China meant tourists pointing
cameras at the Great Wall.
Now the attraction is not the longest Great Wonder of the
World, but the world's fastest growing economy. According to Penn
State doctoral graduate and Shanghai native, Aimin Yan, joint
ventures and foreign investment doubled between 1992 and 1993, to
reach $25.7 billion.
"American companies, along with companies from other
countries, are all scrambling to get into the Chinese market,"
says Barbara Gray, a professor of organizational behavior who
collaborated with Yan on a study of Chinese-American joint
ventures. "We were curious about how organizations from different
countries with different cultural backgrounds would collaborate,
when they had different objectives and reasons for joining
together."
From interviews with representatives of four joint ventures,
Gray and Yan developed a simple model of the dynamics of such a
partnership. Like a three-piece domino chain, their model
predicted that bargaining power ("what each party brings to the
table," says Gray) would forecast the level of management control
("the influence of each partner over key decisions"), which in
turn would determine performance ("the degree to which each
partner's objectives are met"). Bargaining power could be any of
three types (context-based, capital resource-based, or non-capital
resource-based), while management control could be
strategic, operational, or structural.
Yet when they surveyed 90 companies in the United States and
their partners in China, they found, for the most part, that this
domino model "was too simplistic," says Gray.
For instance, although American companies usually had more
context-based power (they can choose from several partners), Gray
and Yan did not find that this flexibility translated into
greater control.
On the other hand, capital resources (usually cash from the
American side, land and buildings from the Chinese) determined
not only operational control (meaning that everyday operations
would most likely be supervised by managers from the top
contributor), but also strategic control.
"Strategic control," says Gray, "has to do with appointments
to the board of directors, who make the long-term decisions for
the venture. This direct relationship makes a lot of intuitive
sense. If a company has to put money on the line, it would want
to have direct control."
Yet the third form of control -- structural -- was not
proportional to the capital resources invested. "Structural
control is the extent to which a joint venture is organized like
the parent company," says Gray. "Some American companies
basically tried to take the organizational approach they have in
the U.S. and replicate it in China. The problem is that people
don't necessarily motivate employees in the same way. For
example, Chinese companies often provide housing for their
employees. That's not part of our reward package in the U.S., but
in China it's a very important aspect of employment."
Rather than being tied to capital, structural control was
connected to non-capital resource-based power -- American
technology or Chinese guanxi. Literally "connections," these
links to Chinese market and government heads are like the Western
system of networking. "Chinese entrepreneurs," Yan notes, "tend
to trust people rather than organizations."
In their domino model, Gray and Yan had hypothesized that
the higher the level of control exerted by a partner, the more of
its goals it would achieve. But their results showed that only
the day-to-day operational control affects performance.
"We had thought that the company with the most membership on
the board would influence what objectives were put forward. We're
coming to understand that it's not simply control that affects
performance," says Gray.
"Factors such as whether the companies had mutual trust,
whether they shared common goals in the joint venture, and
whether these goals were written into the contract played a part
in dictating the overal performance of the venture."
Adds Yan, "It's still a competitive relationship."
Gray is now developing an executive program at Penn State to
teach the ways of cross-cultural negotiations. "Our work has led
me to rethink some research that has been around on cross-cultural negotiations. In particular, to take into account what
each partner thinks the other is doing and how culture influences
these perceptions."
Barbara Gray, Ph.D., is professor of organizational behavior in
the Smeal College of Business Administration, 408 Beam Building,
University Park, PA 16802; 814-865-3822. She directs the Center
for Research in Conflict and Negotiation. Aimin Yan, Ph.D., is
now assistant professor at Boston University. Han Han Vuong is a
former R/PS intern.
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